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Abstract
This article discusses Descartes’s preferred focus on morally and theologically neutral
subjects and points out the impact of this focus on the scientific status of theology.
It does so by linking Descartes’s method to his transformation of the notion of sub-
stance. Descartes’s Meditations centred around epistemological questions rather than
non-human intelligences or the life of themindbeyond thisworld. Likewise, inhis early
works, Descartes consistently avoided referring to causal operators. Finally, having first
redefined the notion of substance in the Principia, Descartes would completely aban-
don making use of this notion in his later years. Indeed, in contrast to many authors
before and after him, Descartes never showed any interest in the long-established
metaphysical interpretation of substances as being causal factors of natural change.
With God, nature, and mind commonly serving as instances of substantial causality,
Descartes’s philosophy had a huge impact on the place of God in science and discreetly
excluded theology as a subject to which his method might be applied.
Keywords
metaphysics – mind – substance – science – God – theology – method
1 Introduction
In a letter to Pierre Chanut of the 1st of November 1646, Descartes confesses
that moral philosophy was “a subject” that he “must not get involved in writing
about.”Wemay read this comment in a variety of ways. In one sense, it confirms
Descartes’s often-repeateddesire to keep clear of philosophical controversy.We
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may also see it as an indirect excuse to Queen Christina for the kind of natural
questions that he had thus far presented as the primary field of his intellectual
interests. Yetmore importantly with respect to the immediate context inwhich
the remark was made, it is equally indicative of Descartes’s acute awareness of
the existence of a morally neutral field of philosophising; a domain of science
invulnerable to moral or religious criticism.
Instead of simply declaringmoral philosophy not to be his thing, Descartes’s
decision to avoid moral philosophical debate is here presented as a conscious
decision, related to the fact that moral philosophy did not promise any cer-
tainty of truth. Though disciplinary boundaries might often be trespassed by
others, Descartes makes clear he had no intention himself to engage in it.
Indeed, referring to the “slander” of “Messieurs les Regens” (presumably a refer-
ence to theUtrecht authorities), and to the accusations of scepticism and athe-
ism that had been addressed to him by Father Bourdin and Dominee Voetius,
Descartes’s words to Chanut leave no doubt as to his own conviction of the
political and religious neutrality of the subjects he had always dealt with, his
own view being that he did not even come close to the kind of risk involved in
the moral issues these false accusations implied.1
In what follows, I shall want to examine in what manner and to what extent
Descartes’s philosophical position is indeed suggestive of the historical demar-
cation of a new domain of disinterested scientific inquiry. My focus shall be
on metaphysical issues relevant to the separation of the philosophical and
theological domains, and I shall argue that it was in fact metaphysics itself
that Descartes sought to evade, as well as the kind of moral questions that
accompany a metaphysical view on things, rather than moral philosophy as
such.
2 Descartes on Forms and Substances
Reassuring Chanut that the kind of sciences he had dealt with simply had no
bearingonpolitics or religion,Descartes, in his letter, sumsup someof themore
sensitive things he might have touched instead:
What would they [i.e., his critics: the Utrecht City Council, Bourdin,
Voetius] not say if I [i.e., Descartes] undertook to examine the right value
of all the things we can desire or fear, the state of the soul after death,
1 Descartes to Chanut, 1 November 1646, AT IV 536–537; CSMK 299.
method vs. metaphysics 205
Church History and Religious Culture 100 (2020) 203–218
how far we ought to love life, and howwe ought to live in order to have no
reason to fear losing our life?2
Some of these questions seem to suggest philosophical themes that Descartes
was already in the process of becoming less anxious to tackle from a new,
physiological, perspective—but in fact, the way in which they are formulated
suggests that according to Descartes they were just as much irresolvable as the
famous question of the state of the soul after death. His refusal to deal with the
latter question, moreover, had already marked the novelty of Descartes’s own
dealings with the discipline he sometimes called “philosophy,” but more often
“first philosophy” or “metaphysics,” a discipline he had, in fact, unrecognisably
transformed with the publication, in 1641, of hisMeditations.
For a seventeenth-century book on metaphysics, Descartes’s Meditations
were spectacularly silent on the question of immortality. Whilst the question
was still of central importance to academic aswell as to popularworks of meta-
physics,Descartes showedno interest at all in the things thatwere routinelydis-
cussed with respect to the activity of the soul after death. Indeed, the absence
of a discussion on the anima separata in Descartes is an important facet of the
way inwhich his dealings with the soul were driven by an interest in the notion
of what he calls “thought”—i.e., whatwewould call ‘consciousness’—aswell as
to the epistemological question of the reliability of experience—but all of this
to the complete demise of an interest in the disembodied metaphysical entity
of the soul itself.3
This in itself was a revolution with respect to the subject-matter of meta-
physics, but it is a revolution that cannot be understood independently of
a more general disregard of metaphysical entities in the earlier Descartes.
Indeed, the new orientation of Descartes’s metaphysics and its indifference to
the soul as the object of metaphysical investigation has a background in his
preliminary rejection of metaphysical entities in physics, and it is to these that
I shall turn first: to the notions, that is, of forms and substances.
Besides expressing himself to be disinclined to elaborate on moral philo-
sophical themes in the 1640s, Descartes had already shown himself reluctant
to discuss any type of metaphysical question in the early 1630s. Convinced of
the fact that allowing for the activity of metaphysical factors of change was
2 Ibid.
3 See my “La découverte du domain mental: Descartes et la naturalisation de la conscience,”
Noctua 3 (2016-2; online 14 August 2017), 239–294, http://www.didaschein.net/ojs/index.php/
noctua/index, there 270–284, where I offer works by Jean de Silhon and Franco Petri Burgers-
dijk, respectively, as examples of a popular and an academic treatise on metaphysics.
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irrelevant for explaining natural processes, Descartes had deliberately aimed to
avoid getting entangled in scholastic metaphysical debates, sometimes excus-
ing himself by saying he had no wish “to break the peace with the philoso-
phers.”4
It was, more specifically, his refusal to take into account the ‘natures’ or ‘sub-
stantial forms’ of things, and his concomitant rejection of the notion of ‘real
qualities,’ that distinguished Descartes’s philosophy from the philosophies of
his contemporaries, and on account of this resulted in what, pace Daniel Gar-
ber, we might describe as Descartes’s surprisingly ‘non-metaphysical’ physics.
Content with keeping a philosophical truce, danger of war for Descartes lay
in the touchy subject of the metaphysics of forms—a subject on which he did
not wish to argue, but nevertheless showed where his preferences lay on every
page. In fact, for Descartes, there were two ways of being non-metaphysical
in physics: as there was no need for substantial forms in physics proper, nei-
ther was there any need, according to Descartes, for souls in physiology, i.e.,
in the explanation of the animal body. Both with respect to physiological ques-
tions andwith respect to the subject of nature at large, Descartes’s unpublished
early works thus mark a clear turning point in seventeenth-century scientific
thought. His crucial step is no longer to make use of the idea of active prin-
ciples as the metaphysical factors that may be held responsible for natural
change.
The consequences of this step, however, extended far beyond the initial
questions of cosmology and physiology. Stripping both inanimate nature and
living bodies of their active forms, Descartes’s way of doing physics implied the
exclusion of God, nature and the human soul, as well as of other metaphysical
factors of causality, from the explanations of natural processes; thereby effec-
tively giving occasion to the way in which such metaphysical agents would be
given new roles in Descartes’s mature philosophy and science.
To see this, it will be of interest to consider towhat extentDescarteswaswill-
ing to meet scholastic metaphysical needs when, in the early 1640s, he finally
took up the challenge to confront the philosophers. Faced with an onslaught
of theological criticism, Descartes decided to address the philosophers after
all—not with the publication of his Meditations, but with the publication of
his Principia, the book that, as his Summa philosophiae, he explicitly intended
4 AT VI, 239. On the successive stages of Descartes’s intellectual focus, see my article “Philoso-
pher defying the Philosophers: Descartes’s Life and Works,” in The Oxford Handbook of
Descartes and Cartesianism, ed. Steven Nadler, Tad M. Schmaltz, and Delphine Antoine-
Mahut (Oxford, 2019), 3–24.
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to be his decisive answer to the likes of Bourdin and Voetius and to work as a
means for drawing benevolent scholastics to his side.5
3 ‘Substance’ in Descartes
What do we find in Descartes’s Summa with respect to the replacement or
transformation of scholastic metaphysical notions? Naturally, no attention is
given in the Principia to the notions of ‘substantial form’ or ‘real qualities’, but it
is striking that at least the notion of substance—anotionDescartes had already
made ample use of in theMeditations—is given a newplacewithin the context
of Descartes’s alternative formof philosophical analysis. Principia I 51 famously
defines ‘substance’ in terms of independence, although it also argues against
the univocal applicability of this term. A substance is “a thing which exists in
such a way as to depend on no other thing for its existence,” but Descartes adds
that this definitiondoesnot imply that there is any “distinctly intelligiblemean-
ing” of the term that is “common to God and his creatures.”6
Substantiality, in other words, does not bind God and other “substantial”
things in such a way as to be indicative of even themost abstract of similarities
between them. What follows, accordingly, is in no way a reinstallment of the
old notion of substantiality, or a reinstitution of the traditional way in which
metaphysical factors of change formed part of the description of natural phe-
nomena. Descartes’s notion of substance, by contrast, has only a very limited
use. In the Principia, it functions primarily as a way to emphasize the idea that,
amongst the phenomenawemay conceptualize, we recognize only two sorts of
things: “created thinking substance” on the onehand and “corporeal substance”
on the other.7 In accordance with this, the “natures” of these two versions of
created substance are explicitly said to be completely absorbed by their vari-
ous attributes: thought and extension. As a follow-up, Descartes makes clear
that this leaves no room for an abstract notion of substance that might func-
tion in any other way than for us to make what Descartes presents as being a
“conceptual distinction”—the distinction between the attributes we recognize
5 Cf. Descartes to Mersenne, January 1642, AT III 523 / CSMK 209–210. See also Van Ruler,
“Philosopher defying the Philosophers,” (see above, n. 4), 16.
6 René Descartes, Principia philosophiae I 51, AT VIII-I 24 / CSM I 210. Curiously, the French edi-
tion adds to the text of this paragraphadefinitionwith respect to “created things” in scholastic
terms, restoring the traditional way of seeing things in terms of substances next to qualities
and attributes, but this is an add-on that has no bearing either on the immediate context or
on what follows.
7 Cf. Descartes, Principia I 54, AT VIII-I 25 / CSM I 211.
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and the things we concludemust exist on the basis of our ability to distinguish
such attributes.8
What is important about this very cautious handling of the notion, is that
even if the notion of substance thus, in Descartes’s own philosophy, evokes
the idea of “real things” behind the appearance of attributes—and potentially
even of metaphysical beings—he still refuses to make use of the idea that sub-
stances might serve to function as metaphysical principles of natural change.
More than that, Descartes does not even care to establish what, in the end,may
count as individual substances at all. Is it the physical universe as a whole, our
minds, in as far as we experience these individually, constellations of things or
thoughts, or any other type of physical or mental domain? Descartes’s Summa
simply offers no answer to this.
The absence of any such answers,moreover, is not just indicative for theway
in which Descartes’s philosophical position does not lend itself to the school-
book type of summaries we are apt to make on its basis; it is also indicative of
the very absence of metaphysical topics in Descartes. Indeed, in Descartes, the
substance-mode ontology functions only as a way of dealing with the separa-
tion of distinct domains of philosophical inquiry. It is, in other words, only the
existence of incongruous properties that offers experiential confirmation of an
ontological divide, which turns the concept of ‘substance’ itself into an expe-
riential Grenzbegriff, and in fact a very meagre concept in ontological terms. It
is as if the cautious tripartition of experiential fields that Descartes would later
offer in his answer to Princess Elisabeth’s metaphysical queries, is already pre-
pared in the twofold division of domains Descartes presents in Principia I 63.9
More important is what is thereby left out. What we do not find in Des-
cartes—neither in the Principles, nor in any other of his works—is a notion
of substance that meets the two requirements of substantiality philosophers
had traditionally associated with the notions of ‘substance’ and ‘form’: the idea
of causal activity, namely, combinedwith the idea of individuality. A substance,
in other words, served as a metaphysical ground for the idea that an active
force takes care of the activation of nature (or of parts of nature), combined
with the idea of a metaphysical identity that might be acknowledged as the
bearer of such force. As for activation, the onlymetaphysical argument we find
8 Descartes, Principia I 63, AT VIII-I 30–31 / CSM I 215.
9 Challenged by Elisabeth to explain how the soul might determine the body to perform vol-
untary actions (AT II 661), Descartes answered that all one can do, is to distinguish between
physical, mental, and combined phenomena (i.e., phenomena of mind-body interaction) on
the basis of our inborn ‘notions’ of all of these kinds of events, without reducing any one of
them to the other. Cf. Descartes to Elisabeth, 21 May 1643, AT III 663–668 / CSMK 217–220.
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in Descartes is the hypothesis that the clockwork of nature must once have
been set into motion by God.10 Yet nowhere do metaphysical identities enter
the description of natural processes themselves. Likewise, neither is the idea
of the individuality of bodily objects anchored in any metaphysical principle
of substantial unity.11
4 Non-Cartesian and Quasi-Cartesian Substances
It can hardly be overemphasized to what extent this “Baconian” type of meta-
physical restraint, which I presume may otherwise be found only in material-
ist contexts, is an exceptional philosophical position within the seventeenth-
century mind-set. Other novatores, both before and after Descartes, and both
of non-Cartesian and Cartesian backgrounds, might still call for a notion of
substantiality that did comply to an Aristotelian ontological outlook and to
Aristotelian ontological demands. To offer some examples of alternative philo-
sophies—philosophies that reverted to traditional conceptions of substantial-
ity, we might point, first, to non-Aristotelian philosophies that might still call
for alternative principles. Examples may be found in the many Renaissance
philosophies that introduced a choice collection of either classical elements,
alchemical principles, or more Platonizing conceptions of active identities,
such as the notion of a ‘World Soul.’12
10 The idea occurs as one of a series of suppositions inChapter 6 of RenéDescartes, Lemonde
ouTraité de la lumière, AT XI 34 / CSM I 91 in particular, as well as in Principia II 36, AT VIII-
I 61–62 / CSM I 240, where God is presented as “the primary cause of motion.”
11 As Geneviève Rodis-Lewis emphasized back in 1950, “Cartesian philosophy does not pro-
vide (…) anyprinciple ensuring the intrinsic individuation of material objects” so that “the
apparent individuality of material objects is ultimately based on no substantial identity.”
Geneviève Lewis, L’ Individualité selon Descartes (Paris, 1950), 59 and 60, respectively.
12 Even Francis Bacon distinguished between active, though material, forms of ‘spirit’ and
passive forms of ‘tangible essence’ as stand-ins for the causal roles of Aristotelian forms
andmatter. Cf., e.g., NovumOrganum II 7. Other principles equally sought to provide nat-
ural explanations either in terms of active spiritual and passive material principles, or in
material substances that were distinguished according to their envisioned active and pas-
sive causal roles. In alchemy, the threesome of sulphur, mercury, and salt might represent
active, passive, and mediate factors, or active and passive factors in dual combinations.
As Lawrence Principe haswritten: “Theories aboutmatter and its composition—Zosimo’s
“soul and body,” Jābir’s Mercury and Sulfur, Gerber’s minima, Paracelsus’s tria prima, the
Scholastic’s prime matter and substantial form, Van Helmont’s semina, and all the rest—
undergirded alchemical aims and directed practical laboratory endeavors.” Cf. Lawrence
M. Principe, The Secrets of Alchemy (Chicago, 2013), 207. For further examples, as well as
for some of the other philosophies discussed further on in this section, see also my arti-
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Early in the century, moreover, David Gorlaeus (1591–1612), though a fierce
anti-Aristotelian who has been seen as a pioneer in chemistry as well as a fore-
runner in formulating what has been called the upcoming ‘substance-mode
ontology,’13 could not fathom the idea that natural philosophy would cease to
preoccupy itself with uncovering substantial, and thus causally responsible,
actors of natural change. He accordingly reproduced standard scholastic max-
ims such as that ‘accidents cannot produce a substance’, defending these on the
basis of the equally scholastic type of argumentation that accidents are onto-
logically “poorer” (vilius) and “more imperfect” than a substance—for which
reason they cannot bring about anything substantial.14
We even encounter the need for a full-blown idea of substantiality pop-
ping up in Cartesian authors after Descartes. The self-appointed Cartesian
physician Heydentryk Overkamp, for instance, argued against Descartes that
movement must be more than a simple form of translatio or ‘transfer.’ It must
be a ‘substance’ (selfstandigheyt), since, according to Overkamp “it is a con-
tradiction to say that an accident or a hoedanigheyt” might be “a principle
of change.”15 Overkamp might in a sense be considered more Cartesian than
Descartes himself for his way of explaining apparent situations of rest in terms
of a “pressure” by the surrounding, inherentlymobile, and therefore constantly
pressing matter. In his commentary on the second book of the Principia of
1683, however, he is also critical of Descartes, most notably condemning the
latter’s idea of motion in terms of a translatio (a ‘transfer’ or, in Dutch: ver-
voering), and as a “modus of the body,” arguing that in this manner, only the
“effect” of movement is evoked.16 Although he next takes the unprecedented
step actually to equate matter and motion, Overkamp’s argumentation was
likewise driven by an ontological interpretation of the notion of substantial-
ity that reinvokes the idea that only substances may count as principles of
change.
cle “Substance in Early Modern Philosophy” in the Springer Encyclopedia of EarlyModern
Philosophy and the Sciences, ed. Dana Jalobeanu and Charles T. Wolfe, forthcoming.
13 The Flemish-Frisian youth David van Goorle (1591–1612), a Leiden theology student,
gained such renown for his atomism that Leiden University would later name its chem-
istry building after him. OnGorlaeus as a potential precursor of Descartes inmetaphysics,
see Helen Hattab, Descartes on Forms andMechanisms (Cambridge, 2009).
14 Seemy article “Substantiële entiteiten zonder vorm:Gorlaeus’ worstelingmet Aristoteles,”
It Beaken: Tydskrift fan de Fryske Akademy 76 (2014), 197–228.
15 See my article “Spinoza in Leiden,” in Spinoza en zijn kring: een balans van veertig jaar
onderzoek, ed. Henri Krop (Rijnsburg, 2019), 31–44.
16 Heydentryck Overkamp, Nader Ondersoeck over het Tweede Deel van de Beginselen der
Wijsbegeerte van Renatus Descartes (Amsterdam: J. ten Hoorn, 1683), 46–47.
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In fourth instance, we might, of course, refer to the so-called “occasional-
ists,” who took thewholly un-Cartesian step of (re)introducing the idea of mind
acting on matter as a metaphor relevant for understanding natural change.
Again, it must be emphasised that such a notion of natural substances acting
as principles of change is a notion not to be found in Descartes’s physics, nor
is it a category that plays any role in Descartes’s metaphysics. The question,
accordingly, whether Descartes himself was an occasionalist, is a misguided
question.17 Aristotelian critics aswell as occasionalist, Spinozist and Leibnizian
followers of Descartes continued to be intrigued by the question ‘If forms do
not activate matter, what, then, does?’ This, however, was a question Descartes
himself consistently ignored. Although there is a strong human propensity to
think that something must be responsible for action, that something must do
the causalwork, the very idea behind Cartesian physics is that themetaphor of
mind acting onmatter should no longer be considered a valid form of scientific
explanation. The natural world, indeed, is matter without form.
A fifth example of a revival of metaphysical argumentation beyond Des-
cartes may be found in Spinoza’s Cogitata metaphysica. The fact itself that
Spinoza saw the need to add a series of Metaphysical Thoughts of his own to his
1661 commentary on Descartes’s Principles indicates to what extent he found
a philosophical analysis in terms of causal entities to be missing in Descartes.
Whilst theseCogitatametaphysica confer no further causal role on—or even as
much asmention—theCartesian ego, ample attention is given to an analysis of
God’s role in nature through his attributes; an analysis wholly complementary
to anything Descartes had written in the Principia. Despite the fact that sec-
ondary literature on the Cogitatametaphysica is still scarce, and that it remains
true what Theo Verbeek already said in 2003, namely that “[of] all of Spinoza’s
texts, the Cogitata metaphysica is the most enigmatic and the least studied,”18
we may thus take what Spinoza wished to add to his commentary on the Prin-
17 See also my article “Minds, Forms and Spirits: The Nature of Cartesian Disenchantment,”
Journal of theHistory of Ideas 61 (2000), 381–395, inwhich I argued against trying to decide
the thenmuch-discussedquestionof Descartes’s ownpresumed “occasionalism.”Onocca-
sionalism, see also Ursula Renz and Han van Ruler, “Okkasionalismus,” in Enzyklopädie
Philosophie, ed. Hans Jörg Sandkühler, 3 vols. (Hamburg, 2010), 2: 1843–1846.
18 Theo Verbeek, “ “Zijn” en “Niet-Zijn” in Spinoza’s Cogitata metaphysica,” in Spinoza en de
scholastiek, ed. Gunther Coppens (Leuven, 2003), 91–101, there 99. Characteristic for the
lack of critical historical reflections on the text of theCogitata is, for example, the fact that
the third chapter on ‘TheMetaphysicalThoughts’ inAlexanderDouglas’s (otherwise inter-
esting) book about Spinoza and Dutch Cartesianism is about anything and everything,
except the Cogitatametaphysica. Cf. Alexander X. Douglas, Spinoza&Dutch Cartesianism:
Philosophy and Theology (Oxford, 2015), 64–90.
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ciples (and thus his reasons for writing the Cogitata) to lie in the sphere of
supplementing what Descartes had neglected to offer, namely, a metaphysical
account of God’s role in nature.19
Of course, God’s role becomingmore andmore identified, even in the young
Spinoza, with that of nature itself, there is as little room in Spinoza as there had
been in Descartes for causal forms of substantiality within nature. Yet the idea
that there is a need for metaphysical suppliers of causal force is reinstated in
Spinoza, with God taking over this role in all things natural as the sole instanti-
ation of ametaphysical entity that provides for a genuinely substantial support
of natural activity. Crucial as this idea was to Spinoza, it would later come to be
expressed in the very first proposition of his Ethics, which (in a scholasticman-
ner reminiscent of Gorlaeus) states that “A substance is by nature prior to its
attributes.”20 Spinoza, in otherwords, restores the notion of substance to its full
meaning, dressing it up in its full metaphysical attire as the ontological entity
that is endowed with activation and individuality.
In similar ways, other late seventeenth-century philosophical positions also
exemplified the need felt for reintroducing metaphysical forms of ontological
dependency, whether this occurred in the more Aristotelian sense of reintro-
ducing forms that provided nature with a metaphysical substructure of being
and activity, or in the more Platonizing form that argued for metaphysical
objects from an epistemological perspective, as in the Spinozistic account of
God-given adequate insights or Malebranchean forms of a vision-en-Dieu.21
Here too, Descartes’s epistemological analysis is always on the this-worldly side
of human experience. Descartes might well thank God, where appropriate, for
the apparently gratuitous way in which human beings are equipped with a fac-
ulty of reason enabling them to make sense of sense experience.22 He never
19 With its non-Cartesian attention to God’s role in nature through his attributes, the Cogi-
tata metaphysica provide exactly this type of additional analysis.
20 Spinoza, Ethics I 1.
21 ForMalebranche’s idea of ‘illumination’ in terms of the vision-en-Dieu, see NicholasMale-
branche, Recherche de la vérité III 6–7, ed. Geneviève Lewis (Paris, 1946), vol. 3, 248–256.
For a discussion of Malebranche’s epistemological steps, see, e.g., Daisie Radner, Male-
branche: A Study of a Cartesian System (Assen, 1978), 52–59.
22 It must be said, however, that, in the conclusion of theMeditations, this type of gratitude
comes to be expressed only implicitly where Descartes argues that, “notwithstanding the
immense goodness of God,” natural forms of deception are likely to occur, but may nev-
ertheless be corrected—a consideration that is of “the greatest help to me, not only for
noticing all the errors to which my nature is liable, but also for enabling me to correct or
avoid them without difficulty. For I know that in matters regarding the well-being of the
body, all my senses report the truth much more frequently than not. Also, I can almost
always make use of more than one sense to investigate the same thing; and in addition, I
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does so, however, in order to render this into an argument in favour of the
need for the mind to enter some metaphysical realm that provides an abso-
lute foundation for the recognition of physical facts. Indeed, with respect to
the vision-en-Dieu in particular, there is no reason, in Descartes, to find ameta-
physical ground for providing sensible species with an interpretation. Just as
there is no occasionalist need, in Descartes, for a metaphysical grounding of
change, there is neither any Spinozistic or Malebranchean-type of need for a
metaphysical grounding of knowledge apart from the epistemological project
of being able to give a coherent interpretation of experience.
Without pursuing to add to the list of non-Aristotelian revivers of substance
theory such obvious metaphysical revisionists as Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz,
let us simply note that beyond Descartes, seventeenth-century intellectual his-
tory would witness a series of quick—though ultimately short-lived—revivals
of a metaphysical way of seeing things in which the question ‘if forms do
not activate matter, what, then, does?,’ led to a restoration of the metaphys-
ically charged interpretation of substantiality that Descartes himself consis-
tently ignored.23 The reason is every time the same: there is a strong human
propensity to think that there must be something responsible for natural activ-
ity! Something, in other words, must do the causal work. The very idea, how-
ever, behind Cartesian natural philosophy had been that the metaphor of
mind acting on matter could no longer be considered a valid form of scientific
explanation—which is why we do not find a similar propensity in Descartes.
Again, for him, the natural world, at least as far as we might understand it, was
matter without form.
5 Theology without Substance
Similarly, the notions of God and the ‘I’, too, are virtually stripped of theirmeta-
physical roles inDescartes, the reasonbeing that his philosophical interest does
not extend to the kind of questions later rehabilitators of the substances, forms,
and essences may have tried to answer on the basis of such metaphysical foot-
ings. I cannot here go into all the aspects inwhichDescartes’sMeditations devi-
ated from traditional metaphysics by being a primarily epistemological and
can use both my memory, which connects present experiences with preceding ones, and
my intellect, which has by now examined all the causes of error.” Cf. Descartes, Medita-
tions, AT VII 88 and 89, respectively / CSM II 61.
23 See also my article on “Substance in Early Modern Philosophy,” in the Springer Encyclope-
dia of Early Modern Philosophy and the Sciences (see above, n. 12).
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neurophysiologically driven project, but it may suffice to point to the absence
of such issues as an enumeration of divine attributes, for instance, or the ques-
tion of immortality, to point out only some of the most striking differences of
scope between Descartes’s metaphysics and the science of metaphysics as it
had traditionally been conceived—let alone that we might find in Descartes
such Spinozistic themes as the notion of a science of ethics culminating in
the idea of spiritual ecstasy on the basis of the tried and tested theological
notion thatmental ecstasy involves combining a full necessitarianism to an act
of love.24
Yet even if there is no metaphysical concept of nature in Descartes, is it not
true that Descartes himself continued tomake use at least of the metaphysical
entities of the ‘I’ and of God? Is it not obvious to any reader of theMeditations,
that both the ‘I’ andGodplay crucial roles in the build-up of its argumentation?
The relevant answer here,must be that yes, the ‘I’ as well as God are very promi-
nent in Descartes’s work of metaphysics, but they are never the subject-matter
of philosophical investigation in the way treatises on themetaphysica specialis
traditionally treated and explained their position on God, the soul, angels, and
the like. In this sense, the Meditations are in fact silent on both the nature of
God and the nature of the human soul.
Indeed, the naturalisation of mental experience is such a central theme in
Descartes that even within the Meditations, a book that deals primarily with
the epistemological question of human intellectual fitness, the soul comes to
function as an introspective basis for understanding psychosomatic processes,
rather than for understanding anything about the soul itself. This is also what
will remain Descartes’s prime focus during the later 1640s: to provide for a
theory of the passions on the basis of a pragmatic interpretation of the inter-
action of body and soul—a neurophysiological interest that we do not find in
authors who put a ban on the idea of mind-body interaction for metaphysical
reasons. In this sense, Descartes again has no qualms with completely ignoring
any treatment of the ‘I’ in terms of a metaphysical object.
The same, moreover, is true for God. According to Michael Della Rocca, a
core aspect of Descartes’s notion of God, is that it presents us with the idea of
a being at once “all-powerful,” but yet “non-threatening”:
24 On the relationship between Spinoza and early modern theology, see my article “Beat-
itude and the Scope of Grace: Early-Modern Morals and the Paradoxes of Felicity,” in
Inexcusabiles: Salvation and the Virtues of the Pagans in the EarlyModern Period [Archives
internationales d’histoire des idées 229], ed. Alberto Frigo (Cham, 2020), 107–123; https://
doi.org/10.1007/978‑3‑030‑40017‑0.
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Descartes’ general strategy […] is ingenuous: in positing this all-powerful,
but non-threateningGod, i.e. in insulating claims aboutGod’s power from
what might be thought to be their standard implications concerning the
features of created beings, Descartes is paving the way for philosophical
inquiry into worldly matters […] to proceed unfettered by worries about
placing illegitimate limitations on God’s power. Although God obviously
plays a central role in Descartes’ philosophy, we can see that, with this
strategy, Descartes takes a big step towards the view—which was to be so
influential later—that the nature and qualities of God have no straight-
forward bearing on the kinds of philosophical claims we can legitimately
reach concerning finite objects.25
Della Rocca presents this “general strategy” as a conscious approach Descartes
exhibits in dealing with a combination of philosophical themes, also includ-
ing his way of arguing against the univocity of divine and finite being and of
pleading for God’s creation of eternal truths. In all such cases, however, there is
a common thread to be found in Descartes’s way of setting aside the notion of
God in the scientific description of finite things. Avoiding any understanding
of entities in terms of their inner forces, Descartes’s separation of God and cre-
ation is in fact nothing else than a further instance of his general disinclination
to refer to the metaphysical presence of a substantial agent in the explanation
of things natural.
6 Voetius’s Nightmare
If Descartes’s natural philosophy itself would not stand the test of time, there
is still much in his philosophy to be considered of lasting importance. Half-way
down the nineteenth-century, August Comte had nomisgivings about present-
ing an already canonised Descartes as the harbinger of positivism. Comte’s
reason for doing sowas that Descartes had been the philosopher who had puri-
fied scientific methodology by eliminating metaphysical beings from nature.
Thus, in hisDiscours sur l’ esprit positif of 1844, the book inwhichComtepinned
down to a specific era of intellectual development what he interpreted as the
birth of the ‘positive’ sciences, René Descartes emerges, together with Bacon,
as the forerunner of positivism because, in Comte’s words, he had “decisively
25 Michael Della Rocca, “René Descartes,” in A Companion to Early Modern Philosophy, ed.
Steven Nadler (Oxford, 2002), 60–79, esp. 71–73, there 73.
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undermined the entire domainof entities (tout le régimedes entités).”26 Comte’s
insightful way of bringing into perspective René Descartes’s contribution to
scientific ways of thinking, is marked not so much by what Descartes himself
brought forward in terms of physical theory, but rather by what he did away
with in order to get there. For Comte, rejecting an Aristotelian ontology was in
fact characterised by a rejection and disqualification of causal entities.
If, today, we discuss questions of orthodoxy and heterodoxy in respect of
seventeenth-century philosophical positions, the first thing we must get clear
about with respect to Descartes, is that Descartes never showed an interest in
fighting either a Protestant or a Catholic causewithin philosophy.Many a com-
mentator who has tried to define his position on the theological questions of
grace and human freedom, has been bewildered by Descartes’s apparent the-
ological inconsistency. Characteristically, Étienne Gilson would even implic-
itly accuse Descartes of bad faith on account of his apparent indecision on
dogmatic issues. Plane assentior, Descartes had told his correspondents twice
with regard to grace: “I totally agree”—but what Descartes was agreeing to in
these cases,were twoabsolutely irreconcilable positions on thequestiondivine
grace, which was the reason for Étienne Gilson to draw the conclusion that, “of
these two plane assentior [affirmations], there is necessarily one too many.”27
The question, however, is not quite as straightforward as this. If Descartes, at
times, was willing to satisfy some Gomarist or Oratorian friend, while at other
instances issuing support for Arminian or Jesuit positions, what he does in such
cases is not to explain himself on some dogmatic position of theology, but to
draw from contemporary debates on freedom and grace some thesis relevant
to a philosophical understanding of the mental processes involved in human
judgment.28 Accordingly, rather than wavering between all sorts of theologi-
cal views, Descartes was putting to use theological forms of analysis in order
to explain an epistemological position of his own. The theological question of
freedomand gracewas thereby naturalised into a theologically neutralised the-
ory of judgement.
In other instances, too, Descartes’s philosophical position carries signs of a
remarkable theological indifference—an indifference that would continue to
affect the reception of Cartesianism in later years. Whereas, historically, reli-
gious dissatisfactionwithDescartes focusedmainly on the difficulty of concep-
26 Auguste Comte, Discours sur l’ esprit positif (Paris: Carilian-Goeury—Dalmont, 1844), 9.
27 Étienne Gilson, “La doctrine cartésienne de la liberté et la théologie,”Bulletin de la société
française de philosophie 14 (1914), 207–258, there 219: “De ces deux plane assentior il y en a
nécessairement un qui est de trop.”
28 Cf. my article “La découverte du domain mental” (see above, n. 3).
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tualising transubstantiation in Catholic quarters, and of understanding ques-
tions of freedomandgrace in termsof a formof a cooperationbetweenprimary
and secondary causes on the Protestant side, what I have tried to indicate by
focusing on the notion of substance, is that the relevance of Descartes’s philos-
ophy to theology lies much deeper still. In fact, because of his reticence to give
in tometaphysical considerations, the idea of giving ultimate grounds and suf-
ficient reasons on ametaphysical level of causal explanation becomes obsolete
in Descartes. Not only did the subject of theology thereby lose its scientific sta-
tus, as Gisbertus Voetius foresaw andmuch feared, but the notion of God itself
lost much of its metaphysical force.
I cannot at present go into all relevant aspects of Descartes’s iconoclastic
handling of the subject of metaphysics, which, besides nature and God, also
involved changes of intellectually handling the notion of the soul.With respect
to the issue of orthodoxy, heterodoxy, and indifference, let me summarize that,
besides functioning in what was left of metaphysics as an object of consider-
ation in establishing the conditions for human knowledge, and occupying a
role as the hypothesis of fate in the context of human psychological needs, the
metaphysical notion of God is by and large absent fromDescartes’s philosoph-
ical works.
7 Conclusion
One might go even further and consider what the later demise of metaphysics
would eventually include. For Descartes the amateur theologian, theological
forms of analysis based on a scholastic notion of analogymight still form quite
an important pastime outside of his published works. Yet without its role as a
factor of causation in the metaphysical grounding of reality, the notion of God
could be no more than either a given, innate concept of the mind put there
by our Maker, or an idea of substantiality projected on the basis of the notion
we have of ourselves, provided as it is by the phenomenological realm of intro-
spection. It is therefore no surprise that, in the long run, the idea that there
were religiously neutral forms of scientific inquiry yielding trustworthy forms
of knowledge that needed no grounding in the agency of metaphysical enti-
ties, would push forward psychology to replace metaphysics as a handmaiden
for theology and would ultimately reduce the realm of religionmore andmore
to human moral and psychological needs.
This is not, of course, to say that Descartes himself was in any way a full-
blownpositivist in the nineteenth-century sense of theword. At the same time,
it would nevertheless seem appropriate to say that, despite the methodologi-
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cal insufficiency of Descartes’s own scientific programme, our latter-day scien-
tific culture shares some important characteristics with the Cartesian world-
outlook in that Descartes already combined a proto-Kantian feel for the lim-
itedness of human cognitive capacities to a proto-Heideggerian awareness of
the attachments of human thought to the everyday practice of life—and,more
particularly with respect to the issues of theology and religion here discussed,
already quite uncompromisingly displayed a proto-Wittgenstinian tendency
towards agnosticism.
If it is in this sense that Descarteswas the ultimate seventeenth-century rep-
resentative of a strict separation between philosophy and theology—a separa-
tion that, to my mind, has too often and too easily been discarded as cowardly
subterfuge on his part—it is historically of importance not to misjudge the
intellectual relevance of this position, but to understand it in terms of the well-
defined and reasonable choice that it was, at least in the face of the alternative
of reverting to an old-school type of substance-metaphysics. Descartes’s refusal
in any way to expand on metaphysical entities and their activities was itself a
form of theological indifference—an indifference that, as Descartes implied
when writing to Chanut, had always been his aim, and formed part of a coher-
ent strategy to try and find certainty only within religiously neutral domains of
knowledge.
